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was fielded in September 1974, when
the author, having retired from active
duty, was on the faculty of the University of Vermont. Kinnard’s guarantees
of anonymity and his rapport with his
peers elicited a response rate of nearly
70 percent. Many of those surveyed also
added written commentaries. Questions
dealt with a range of issues, including
strategy, tactics, personnel management, the role of the media, rules of engagement, and recommended changes
“if we had to do it over.” The findings
are disturbing, not only for people who
lived through the Vietnam era but for
those of us who are witnesses to history
repeating itself in Iraq. Nearly 70 percent of the generals who responded
stated that they were uncertain of the
Vietnam War’s objectives. Many conceded that they had overestimated the
capability of South Vietnamese forces
and had underestimated the extent of
the Army of the Republic of Vietnam’s
corruption and ineptitude. Over 50 percent of respondents thought that U.S.
forces should not have engaged in combat in Vietnam. These views were recorded some seven months before the
fall of Saigon.

among the generals. This is not surprising, given the risks such dissent would
have posed to their careers. Writing in
1976, in the immediate postwar and
Watergate years, Kinnard was cautiously optimistic that the officer corps
could henceforth stand up and be
counted. Unfortunately, thirty years
later, dissent still remains hazardous to
one’s career.

Among the richest data in the book are
the marginal notations by the respondents. It was widely acknowledged that
the system for measurement of progress, based on body counts and kill ratios, fell victim to the natural optimistic
bias of military men. The system was
denounced by one respondent as “a
fake—totally worthless.” Another general replied, “The immensity of the false
reporting is a blot on the honor of the
Army.”

PETER GRABOSKY

Kinnard devotes a good deal of attention to the fact that despite such perceptions, dissent had been uncommon
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Without wishing to strain comparisons
between Iraq and Vietnam, one cannot
read Kinnard’s book without developing a sad sense of history repeating itself. He reminds us that “in the
Vietnam War there was too much tricky
optimism from LBJ on down.” Misplaced faith in the integrity and capacity of the local forces has a familiar ring.
So too do cover-ups of egregious human rights abuses and insensitivity to
indigenous culture.
One hopes that among the generals who
have served or who will serve in Iraq,
there is one who might be tempted to
follow in Kinnard’s footsteps and seek
the candid views of his or her peers
about the conflict. The same lessons remain to be learned.
The Australian National University

Holloway, James L., III. Aircraft Carriers at War:
A Personal Retrospective of Korea, Vietnam, and
the Soviet Confrontation. Annapolis, Md.: Naval
Institute Press, 2007. 479pp. $34.95

For three decades, Admiral James L.
Holloway III has been one of the great
supporters and promoters of the work
of the U.S. Navy’s historians, through
his role as president and then chairman
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of the Naval Historical Foundation, a
position he has actively held since retiring from active duty as Chief of Naval
Operations in 1978. With the Naval
Historical Foundation, Holloway has
played an essential role in developing
the “Cold War Gallery,” now in progress at the National Museum of the U.S.
Navy in the Washington Navy Yard.
His connection to that ongoing project
led him to think about the broader aspects of the Cold War, as well as his
own personal reminiscences of it. With
the publication of this book Admiral
Holloway now makes his own direct
contribution to the writing of naval history, as well as providing a fascinating
memoir of that period.
The genre of the naval officer’s memoir
is a specialized and important one in
naval literature. Unfortunately for historians, few American contributions
have been published in recent decades,
although those of us working in this
field have benefited from the growing
body of transcribed oral history interviews, for use as sources.
Holloway is at his best in his wellcrafted and evocative descriptions of
personal experiences at sea and in the
air. The book opens with one of his
most compelling—a dramatic description of the view from the Mark 37
fire-control director in USS Bennion
(DD 662) as he watched a formation of
Japanese battleships moving at
twenty-five knots with all guns firing as
they emerged from the Surigao Strait
off Leyte on 25 October 1944.
Admiral Holloway insists, “This book
has been about aircraft carriers.” That is
true—aircraft carriers provide a central
strand to Holloway’s career, as well as a
central theme to his book—but the
book is about much more. It is not just

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol61/iss2/21

an enthusiast’s view of his favorite ship
type, although that comes through
clearly enough; his views and experiences are so balanced that they make
the book more than one written for naval aviators alone. This is a book for everyone interested in the U.S. Navy in
the second half of the twentieth century. It is a carefully crafted personal
view of the Cold War era from the
changing perspectives of an exceptionally fine officer as he rises to the top. He
keeps this sharp professional focus, judiciously avoiding personal and tenuous issues. Throughout, Admiral
Holloway shows himself to be an excellent writer, one who has additionally
benefited from very sound advice in
preparing this memoir.
There are many incidents of broad interest to be found in this volume. For
example, readers interested in the history of the Naval War College will take
particular note of Holloway’s account
of how the secretary of defense intervened in the Navy’s selection of the
President of the Naval War College
with a new requirement to interview the
Navy’s candidate, Vice Admiral James
Stockdale.
Most importantly, however, Holloway’s
memoir puts into context his major career achievements, not only in developing the nuclear carrier program but
equally in his concept for the operational organization of the carrier battle
group and his personal involvement in
improving the Navy program management through Strategic Concepts for the
U.S. Navy (NWP-1A). Additionally,
Holloway’s memoir provides interesting insight into the failed Iranian hostage rescue operation of 1980 from his
experience as chairman of the Special
Operations Review Group.
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In “The Future: The Past as Prologue,”
Holloway concludes with an overview
of recent naval trends and with his carefully considered views on the present
and future role for aircraft carriers. In
short, Holloway’s combination of
memoir and history with an explanation of his professional judgments
makes this a book that deserves to be
read widely, by people both inside and
outside the U.S. Navy.
JOHN B. HATTENDORF

Naval War College

Dickinson, H. W. Educating the Royal Navy:
Eighteenth and Nineteenth-Century Education for
Officers. New York: Routledge, 2007. 258pp.
$125

From time to time every reader experiences the peculiar delight of discovering
a fascinating gem of a book lurking behind an unremarkable cover and prosaic title. While not for the casual
reader, Educating the Royal Navy is just
such a find for those with an interest in
the profession of arms at sea. The author, Harry Dickinson of King’s College
London, has done masterful work at
charting the surprisingly convoluted
and highly politicized course of educating the men who led what was at the
time the world’s greatest navy. His book
is well worth reading.
Dickinson dispels many casually held
beliefs concerning Britain’s senior service and its officer corps. For example,
the vaunted lieutenant’s exam, established by Samuel Pepys and later enshrined in C. S. Forester’s Hornblower
series, was not a uniformly applied rigorous test of an officer’s professional
skill and knowledge but a most uneven
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event that at times entered the realm of
the absurd. He also makes clear that patronage and classism were as rampant
in the British naval officer corps as in
its army equivalent. Correcting the historical record is just one of the book’s
contributions to the field.
Dickinson focuses on a major theme in
each chapter, while maintaining a more
or less chronological approach. The
first theme of note is the British attempt
to determine if it was more beneficial to
train officers ashore or afloat and, if
afloat, whether on board dedicated
training ships or on vessels sailing on
active service.
Another theme concerns the men who
did the actual educating. Dickinson
fully describes how shortcomings in the
naval education system led to professional “tutors” who used “cramming”
as a means of getting officers to pass required exams, which did little or nothing to help those officers retain their
temporarily gained knowledge or
deepen the intellectual capital of the
service.
Dickinson, who has taught at the Royal
Navy colleges of Greenwich and
Dartmouth and at the U.S. Naval Academy, does not shy away from comparing British educational efforts to those
of Britain’s rivals. He concludes that the
Royal Navy lagged badly behind those
other naval powers, including Germany. Dickinson also admits that the
Americans developed a “genuine naval
war college” well in advance of their
British cousins.
Dickinson’s book is so interesting that
one wishes he had specifically examined
the impact of the Royal Navy’s unquestionably successful seagoing performance and of the complacency that
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